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Abstract—Technology evolves quickly. Low cost and ready-
to-connect devices are designed to provide new services and
applications for a better people’s daily life. Smart grids or smart
healthcare systems are some examples of such applications all
of them in the context of smart cities. In this all-connectivity
scenario, some security issues arise since the larger is the number
of connected devices the bigger is the surface attack dimension.
This way, new solutions to monitor and detect security events
are needed addressing new challenges coming from this scenario
that are, among others, the number of devices to monitor, the
huge amount of data to manage and the real time requirement to
provide a quick security event detection and, consequently, quick
attack reaction. In this work, the MSNM-Sensor is introduced,
a practical and ready-to-use tool to monitor and detect security
events able to manage this kind of environments. Although it is
in its early development stages, experimental results based on the
detection of well known attacks in hierarchical network systems
proof its suitability to be applied in more complex scenarios like
the ones found in smart cities or IoT ecosystems.
Index Terms—Monitoring, anomaly detection, IDS, networks,
IoT, smart cities
I. INTRODUCTION
Several technical reports forecast of 30 billion IoT (Internet
of Things) devices around the world by 2021 and [1] more
than 3 billions of M2M (Machine to Machine) connections by
2022 [2]. This scenario enables new services and applications
for a better people’s daily life as well as business opportuni-
ties. However, many challenges arise, being security one of the
most important one. The way to monitor and control what is
happening in these kind of scenarios is a great challenge since
the attack exposure surface grows almost exponentially with
the number of devices inter-connected. A more challenging
problem is about how to manage the generated data gathered
from different information sources such as the applications
and networking devices and communications, among others.
In this way, key aspects like managing volume, veracity or
velocity of the data are crucial for a for quick and efficient
detection and reaction responses against security attacks.
Furthermore, these aspects may limit the practical application
of the solutions, and specially, in the described scenario.
To address the previous issues presented in IDS (Intrusion
Detection System), SIEM (System Information and Event
Management) tools are widely used by the specialized com-
munity on ICT security (Information and Communication
Technologies). IDS systems falls into three categories: (1)
Network-based IDS (NIDS), (2) Host-based IDS (HIDS) for
network communication and (3) endpoint monitoring and
detection, respectively. Along with this categories we can also
discern between Anomaly-based IDS (AIDS) or Signature-
based IDS (SIDS), depending on the detection technique
applied. The first one (AIDS) tries to find anomalous patterns
in the monitored information, while the second one (SIDS) is
intends to detect the presence of an attack comparing the gath-
ered information with previously defined attack signatures.
Snort [3] or Zeek (Bro) [4] describe some use application
examples of practical and widely used IDS tools.
About the SIEMs, these kind of tools also include moni-
toring and detection functionalities, but also provide services
for event correlation and reporting capabilities, among others.
Moreover, SIEMs can also manage information collected from
IDS systems as a suitable data source for alerting security
events. Splunk [5] or AlientVault [6] are some examples of
practical and widely used SIEM tools.
However, neither IDSs nor SIEMs can efficiently manage
new monitoring and security event detection requirements that
arise from new communication paradigms and ecosystems,
such as IoT ecosystems. To address this issue, we present
in this paper MSNM-S (Multivariate Statistical Network
Monitoring-Sensor), a hybrid A-IDS (i.e. solution that merges
NIDS and HIDS main functionalities). MSNM-S is a ready to
use tool that enable the management of complex architectures,
for monitoring and security event detection in real time.
This proposal is based on the research presented in Macia´-
Ferna´ndez et al. [7]. The main aim of MSNM-S is to reduce
the network monitoring traffic without losing performance,
a key point in hierarchical network architectures and sys-
tems/ecosystems, like IoT ecosystems. In order to achieve
these goals they use the so-called monitoring statistics, Q-
st and D-st, widely used in MSPC (Multivariate Statistical
Process Control) for industrial processes as we will see in
Section II.
The main features of the MSNM-S are described as follow:
1) Management of the different and heterogeneous data
sources in real time.
2) Reduce, prominently, the network monitoring traffic, but
keeping the anomaly detection performance. Against
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current IDS and SIEM based solutions fed with raw
data, MSNM-S just use two real numbers, the monitor-
ing statistics, to monitor the whole system.
3) Is scalable, versatile, distributed and dynamically adapt-
able to changes in the involved environments, which is
a relevant issue when dealing with network communi-
cations.
4) An easy-to-use front-end, through a interactive and
useful dashboard to control the whole system under
monitoring.
5) It is an open-source project.
MSNM-S current version is released under GPL license and
we encourage the readers to be an active part of the project
which is available at [8].
The paper has been organized has follows. Section II
describes the theoretical fundamentals of multivariate statis-
tical analysis, which supports the core functionality of the
sensor. Section III describes the components and operation
modes of the sensor to be addressed. In Section IV, we
build a realistic and controlled system to validate the anomaly
detection capabilities in the sensor in complex and hierarchical
environments. Moreover, attacks like DoS, data exfiltration
or port scanning are successfully detected and located in the
proposed network architecture as test. Finally, conclusions and
further work are described in Section V.
II. FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS
In this section we briefly introduce the fundamentals of
multivariate statistical analysis which is the basis of the
MSNM-S tool.
A. PCA: Principal Components Analysis
PCA has been proposed to reduce data size (data compres-
sion). PCA identifies a number of linear combinations of the
original variables in a data set X, the so-called Principal Com-
ponents (PCs), containing most of its relevant information
(variability). This is a change of variables from the original
ones in the X space to the PCs subspace. If X is a data matrix
with M variables associated with a given phenomenon and
N observations of each variable, PCA reduces its dimension
from M variables to A PCs by finding the A-dimensional
latent subspace of most variability captured.
PCA is described through the next equation:
X = TA ·PTA +EA (1)
where PA is the M×A loading matrix, TA is the N×A score
matrix and EA is the N×M residual matrix. The maximum
variance directions are obtained from the eigenvectors of
XT ·X, and they are ordered as the columns of PA by the
explained variance. The rows of TA are the projections of
the original N observations in the new latent sub-space. EA
is the matrix that contains the residual error, and it plays a
key role in the anomaly detection, as shown afterwards. The
projection (score) on the PCA subspace of a new observation
is obtained as follows:
tnew = xnew ·PA (2)
where xnew is a 1×M vector to represent a new object; and
tnew is a 1×A vector to represent the projection of the latent
subspace.
The number of PCs in a model, A, can be selected using
several methods, including cross-validation [9][10].
B. Multivariate statistical process control
One of the most common applications of PCA is process
monitoring and anomaly detection and diagnosis, often re-
ferred as MSPC (Multivariate Statistical Network Monitor-
ing). In a MSPC system, Q-st [11] and D-st (also known
as T 2) [12] statistics are the most used techniques. Q-st
compresses the residuals in each observation and D-st is
computed from the scores. With both statistics computed from
the calibration data under normal conditions, control limits
can be established with a certain confidence level [13]. There-
fore, new data are monitored using these limits. An anomaly
is identified when the limits are exceeded. Furthermore, the
contribution of the variables to a detected anomaly can be
investigated with the contribution plots [14].
The Q-st and D-st statistics for a specific observation can
be computed through the following equations:
Dn =
A∑
a=1
(
τan − µa
σa
)2
(3)
Qn =
M∑
m=1
(enm)
2 (4)
where τan represents the score of the n-th observation of the
a-th latent variable, µa and σa stand for the mean and standard
deviation for the scores of that variable in the calibration
data, respectively, and enm represents the residual value
corresponding to the n-th observation of the m-th variable.
III. MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL NETWORK
MONITORING-SENSOR: MSNM-S
The developed tool is based on the so-called MSNM-
S (Multivariate Statistical Network Monitoring-Sensors)
throughout a interconnected systems.
MSNM-S acronym comes from the MSNM approach re-
cently coined by Camacho et al. [13], as the functional core
of each sensor. Such module relies on the use of PCA and
MSPC techniques to compute the previously mentioned Q-
st and D-st statistics for network monitoring and anomaly
detection. Although MSNM proposes a new methodology
method for network anomaly detection, the use of PCA
and MSPC multivariate techniques have been addressed in
previous works for similar purposes. For instance, the work
presented in Maga´n-Carrio´n et al. [15], where the authors
detect data anomalies in WSNs (Wireless Sensor Networks)
and mitigate these anomalies with a multivariate statistical
based missing data imputation.
In the following section, MSNM-S modules are introduced
and deeply explained. In addition, some examples about how
the system works are also presented.
A. MSNM-S Modules
Figure 1 shows the involved MSNM-S functional modules.
These are:
1) IS (Information Source) Module: Easily guess from its
name, the IS module takes care of the data coming from the
information sources to be afterward processed. Two types of
data sources, according to their location, are considered:
• Local (LIS). The information incoming from these data
sources is generated or accessed from the device where
MSNM-S is deployed. For instance, local information
sources can be obtained from IDS (Intrusion Detection
Systems) or firewall log files, netflow traffic flows, host
based information (e.g. syslog in Linux based systems),
among others. LIS are processed by the PARSER module
for information homogenization, feature engineering and
feature extraction.
• Remote (RIS). The incoming data from other MSNM-
S are treated as remote information source. Most of the
data coming from other MSNM-S will be the computed
values of the monitoring statistics Qn,m-st and Qn,m-
st thus allowing the anomaly detection in hierarchical
and complex systems. However, some other information
could be obtained from a remote sensor e.g., those asked
by the security analyst for an anomaly diagnosis.
2) PARSER: In complex and heterogeneous systems it is
common to have different data sources coming from, for
example, network traffic, host based data information, etc.
In order to monitor such kind of systems it is necessary
to process, fuse and homogenize all the data sources in a
common structure to be afterward used to train and test
models for anomaly detection or attack classification. This
process is commonly called feature engineering. For that,
the PARSER module is in charge of it by using the FaaC
approach (Feature-as-a-Counter) [13]. FaaC transform the
original variable space, built from different data sources, in a
new one where the new variables are counters of the original.
For instance, it would be good to count how many connections
to port 80 we had in a certain time window. Consequently,
a high value could indicate that a DoS attack is happening.
FaaC approach has successfully been tested in previous works
together with PCA modeling [7][16].
3) MSNM: This is the sensor functional core. It provides
multivariate statistical based methods and algorithms to com-
pute the monitoring statistics Qn,m-st and Dn,m-st in almost
real time. It allows to detect anomalies in the supervised
system when statistics computed from new observation exceed
certain control limits. Interested readers can find detailed
information about these methods at the reference work [13].
Three are the main MSNM module operations:
• Pre-processing. It performs data pre-processing for both,
new observations and data models. The standard normal-
ization is used by default, though additional methods are
also available.
• Modeling. It is in charge of the sensor calibration
from a set of observations which are, ideally, in NOC
(Normal Operation Condition) conditions i.e., without
known anomalies. Currently, PCA model is used but
other machine learning based techniques can be easily
integrated [17][18]. This model is afterwards used for
monitoring and detecting anomalous behaviors.
• Monitoring. This module computes the above mentioned
statistics for each incoming observation. Together with
[Q1,m+1 ,D1,m+1, ... ,Qn,m+1,Dn,m+1]
[Qn,m ,Dn,m]
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Fig. 1. Functional modules of a generic sensor Sn,m. n corresponds with
the sensor ID and m is hierarchical level ID where the sensor n is deployed.
a pre-computed control limits, the monitoring module
is able to detect anomalous behavior when these limits
are exceeded. MSPC based techniques are used in the
previous operations.
4) COM (COMmunications): COM module allows each
MSNM-S to exchange information. This way, it is in charge
of receiving and sending specific messages. The system
contemplates (but it is not limited) two types of messages:
data and command. They mainly differs in the payload and
type. For example, data message can include whichever the
information needed in sensor operations e.g., the monitoring
statistics. Instead, command messages are devised to control
such an processes.
Depicted in Fig. 1 two information flows are clearly differ-
entiated: monitoring and diagnosis. It is worth to mention that
just the first one is currently implemented being the second
one an ongoing work (see the project at [8]). However, we
decide to mention and describe both of them because they
are complementary. This way, monitoring information flow
exchange data messages containing the computed statistics
Qn,m and Dn,m, while the diagnosis flow controls the entire
diagnosing procedure.
At this early stage, there is no specific routing algorithm
among sensors. Instead, each sensor must know to whom
they send and from who the data should be received. It is
a manually configuration procedure. A self-discovery sensor
process will be added in future releases.
Both flows and the exchanged messages will be described
in Sections III-B and III-C.
5) DIAGNOSIS: After detecting something anomalous in
the system it is time to investigate where the event come
from and why. This task, the diagnosis procedure, is manually
carried out by a security analyst who was alerted by the
system.
The diagnosis procedure could be a tricky and tedious
work because sometimes there are too much information to
analyze. Even more difficult is to diagnose anomalies when
the monitoring systems covers not only few parts of the
system but a complete network architecture. This is our battle
field and how to manage this problem is the duty of the
DIAGNOSIS module.
The DIAGNOSIS module relies on the use of statistical
multivariate techniques (but it is not limited to) to determine
which are the source of the anomaly. Currently, the oMEDA
(observation-based Missing-data method for Exploratory Data
Analysis) [19] method is implemented, though some others
methods can be easily included, for example, the diagnosis
method proposed by the authors in [20] and the others they
compare inside.
Although the DIAGNOSIS module solves the anomaly
diagnostic by itself, it is locally done. Nevertheless, what
would happens if the anomaly comes from a remote source,
for example, from hosts at the deepest level of the hierarchy?.
Determining what data source/s are involved in an anomalous
behavior previously detected at central monitoring console
is not a trivial task. For this reason, we create the DRT
(Diagnosis Routing Table) which acts similarly to the well
known routing IP tables but adding the information of local
and remote sources. The diagnosis flow and routing will be
in details explained in Sections III-B and III-C.
6) MANAGER: As can be seen in Fig. 1, all modules work
together waiting for or passing the inner information that they
need. When and how this information exchange should be at
specific module (those in the gray filled rectangle in the figure)
is leading by this module.
Previously mentioned, two different information flows are
differentiated: monitoring and diagnosis. The first one, in-
volves three main modules (IS, PARSER and MSNM) that
should be invoked one after another because the previous
output acts as input of the next. However, the second one
involves the DIAGNOSIS module which is invoked if certain
message has been received. Orchestrating when and how each
MSNM-S module should run is the duty of the MANAGER.
A more detailed description of the modules interactions,
data exchanged and the role of the MANAGER at each sensor
functional modes will be shown in Section III-B.
B. MSNM-S Operations
Above, the main functional MSNM-S modules were de-
scribed. However, high level operations including several
modules are devised in accordance to the principal MSNM-
S functionalities: monitoring and diagnosis. As mentioned
before, the diagnosis process is still an ongoing work so just
the monitoring operation will be detailed in the following.
1) Monitoring Operation: To be aware of what is happen-
ing in systems or networks is of crucial importance to detect
anomalous behaviors (intended or not). This is the principal
function of the MSNM-S sensor, without it there were no
detection at all. However it is not a trivial task since a previous
work must be done to select what element and information
should be supervised. For that, the monitoring flow and the
involved modules, offer a versatile and scalable tool allowing
the user to freely select data sources and variables to be
monitored.
Figure 2 shows a detailed view of modules’ interactions
and the exchanged information. In the figure, one can see
a hypothetical local data source LISv with Mv variables
to monitor and a total of Nv gathered observations, the
latter split in k batches (bv1, bv2, . . . , bvk). Each batch has
j =Mv variables and i different number of observations each.
Because of that we are able 1) to process less information so
reducing the computation time which is a key point for real
time applications, and 2), to adapt the monitoring time step
granularity, sometimes hardly limited by the monitored data
source or the anomaly to be detected. As will be shown in the
Section IV, 60 seconds is enough to monitor a netflow based
data sources in the detection of DoS attacks, for example.
For each bvk batch of observations a new one is generated
by parsing and aggregating the original information (raw).
This task is the duty of PARSER (see III-A2). At the time of
writing this article, the implemented module was the FaaC
(Feature as a Counter) parser [21]. FaaC includes as new
feature engineering methodology that transforms the original
information variable space in a new one where the new
variables (z) are now counters (Cv) of the original ones.
This smart transformation makes the system highly versatile
and scalable allowing the user to define a huge number
of different new variables from a limited original set. For
example, counting the number of different destination ports
in a certain period of time could be relevant for port scanning
or knocking attacks.
Although just one data source is considered until now,
additional local (LIS) or remote (RIS) ones can also be added.
Figure 2 shows the addition procedure. In this case (but not
limited), three are the data sources involved: two local (LISv
and LISl) and one remote (RISr). At each monitoring step
a new concatenated observation is built. Now, the extended
space will have e variables being e = z+p+2 where z is the
number of variables (counters) from a batch k of source LISv;
p is the number of variables (counters) from the same batch
of source LISl; and RISr has two variables as the number of
statistics generated by the remote sensor. This observation is
the input of MSNM module (see III-A3) which is in charge
of to compute the monitoring statistics (Q(n,m)k, D(n,m)k).
At this point one can detect anomalous behaviors when the
control limits are exceeded by them. Additionally, if this
sensor is not the root in hierarchy the generated statistics
will be also sent to the corresponding remote sensor for
hierarchical monitoring and anomaly detection.
C. Working all together: A hierarchical approach
Aforementioned, a single MSNM-S instance is able to
monitor and detect anomalous behaviors from a wide range
of heterogeneous local and remote data sources. However
the really novel idea behind the use of Q(n,m) and D(n,m)
statistics is their capability of keeping the monitoring and
anomaly detection performance when aggregating them in
hierarchical and complex network environments.
Although the tool will be tested in Section IV in a
realistic network scenario, an example of several MSNM-
Ss cooperating within a hypothetical and common network
deployment will be shown in the following for a better
understanding. For that, Fig. 3 shows a simple network
scenario where several MSNM-Ss are deployed at hosts and
network devices. We can discern in the figure, two involved
information flows: monitoring and diagnosis flow. The former
(black dashed lines) transports pairs of monitoring statistics
([Q(n,m), D(n,m)]) coming from lower to higher levels in the
hierarchy. In this specific example, sensors S1,3, · · · , Sn,3,
deployed at hosts in the deepest architecture level, send the
1 2 3
...2
1 V11
V21
V12 V13 V1j
V22 V23 V2j
Vi1 Vi2 Vi3 Vij
...
...i
j
... ... ... ......
{ Mv
{Nv 1 2 3 ...21 V11V21 V12 V13 V1jV22 V23 V2jVi1 Vi2 Vi3 Vij... ...i j... ... ... .........1 2 3
...2
1 V11
V21
V12 V13 V1j
V22 V23 V2j
Vi1 Vi2 Vi3 Vij
...
...i
j
... ... ... ......
{bv1
{bv2
{bvk
C1v2 ...C2v2 C3v2 Czv2
C1v1 ...C2v1 C3v1 Czv1
1 2 3 z
1 2 3 z
C1vk ...C2vk C3vk Czvk
1 2 3 z
PA
RS
ER
...
PA
RS
ER
...
PA
RS
ER
...{
Cv
PARSER
+
+
+
... ......
MSNM
(MSPC-PCA)
[Q(n,m)1,D(n,m)1]
MSNM
(MSPC-PCA)
MSNM
(MSPC-PCA)
RIS1
...
C[1:z]v1 Qr1,Dr1
C[1:z]v2 Qr2,Dr2
Qrk,Drk
[Qrk,Drk]
C[1:z]vk
RIS2
RISr
LISl
C[1:p]lk
C[1:p]l2
C[1:p]l1
C[1:p]lk
C[1:p]l2
C[1:p]l1
[Qr2,Dr2]
[Qr1,Dr1]
LISv
{
[Q(n,m)k,D(n,m)k]
[Q(n,m)2,D(n,m)2]
Fig. 2. Involved modules and exchanged information among them for a Sn,m monitoring flow. The information is coming from different data sources:
two local (LISv and LISl) and one remote (RISr) to be afterwards divided in k batches (bv1, bv2, . . . , bvk). LIS sources (raw), are parsed by the FaaC
for each batch. The new variables, counters of the original ones, are concatenated together with the remote ones. All together conform the observation to be
monitored. After that, the Qn,m and Dn,m statistics are computed by the MSNM module.
generated statistics [Q(1,3), D(1,3)], · · · , [Q(n,3), D(n,3)] to the
next closest sensor in the hierarchy. Indeed, they act as remote
sources of S1,2. Now, this sensor aggregates and processed
it giving the [Q(1,2), D(1,2)] values. Finally, the root sensor
(S1,1) gathers the statistical information from its immediately
lower levels, processes it and generates the last statistics to be
observed for anomaly detection. This final monitoring task is
commonly carried out by a security analyst who determines
the presence of an anomaly when certain control limits are
exceeded by the statistics [13].
Once the anomaly is detected, a deeper inspection should
be done to determine, for example, where the anomaly comes
from and why. This is the so-called diagnosis procedure that is
represented in Fig. 3 with solid green and dashes brown lines,
command and response involved actions respectively1. In this
example, the anomaly comes from S1,3 which is in charge
of monitoring firewall traffic logs. First, a command message
[Cm] for finding the anomaly origin is sent. How this message
should be routed across the multi-level scenario is defined
in the DRT (Diagnosis Routing Table) which maps RISs
and LISs data sources known by each MSNM-S. However,
who is in charge of determining which source motivates the
anomaly at specific observation for finding it in the DRT?
As mentioned before, the diagnosis algorithm is called for
that purpose. Currently oMEDA [19] is ready to be used,
though some others methods could easily be integrated. This
procedure is repeated until the origin data source is found.
After that, the involved piece of information (raw) falling into
the observation period of time is returned to the root sensor to
be analyzed in details. A new message called response [Rm]
allows this operation.
1Remember that the diagnosis procedure is currently an ongoing work so
the following explanation is just a functional definition of how this process
should work.
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Fig. 3. An hypothetical deployment of several MSNM-Ss (orange boxes)
throughout an interconnected system for a hierarchical monitoring, anomaly
detection (dashed black lines) and diagnosis (solid green and dashed brown
lines).
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF MSNM-S FOR
MONITORING AND ATTACK DETECTION IN COMPLEX
NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS.
A. Experimental environment
In order to evaluate the performance of IDS based systems,
pre-defined and -build datasets are widely used. Consequently,
choosing one or another is a very relevant decision having
strong consequences, not only on the obtained results, but
also on the confidence of the conclusions the authors claim.
In this sense, Macia´-Ferna´ndez et al. [22] build an recent
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Fig. 4. Experimental scenario. Four MSNM-Ss (S1,2, S2,2, S2,3, S1,1) are deployed at each router. Each sensor monitors a netflow local data source
generated from each router while S1,1 also aggregates all the statistics generated by the lower level routers.
and real network dataset that copes with the main drawbacks
found in previous ones. Nevertheless, not all of them are
valid to be used in certain application scenarios because of
the existing differences between the environment where the
dataset was built and the one where the IDS solution will be
deployed. One can think, for example, on smart city scenarios
or IoT ecosystems with a lot of different involved devices and
communications.
Because of the previous reasons self-adaptable, ready to use
solutions for real time anomaly detection are recommended.
These type of approaches could eliminates the need of using
previously gathered datasets which are, on the other hand,
very hard to build.
To validate the monitoring and anomaly detection perfor-
mance of MSNM-S in complex systems, we will spread sev-
eral of them over a controlled scenario with virtual machines
running in a cluster. This scenario has previously been devised
to theoretically proof the hypothesis of the application of
MSNM for hierarchical systems [7]. The key characteristics
of that will be introduced in the following though interested
readers get more details in the mentioned reference.
The complete scenario with the different machines is
depicted in Figure 4. This environment simulates a typi-
cal network architecture of a corporation. That is why we
can observe several sub-networks, network devices and end-
devices. For instance, a DMZ is located at the inner network,
separated from the outside world (Internet) with a Border
Router (BR) and departmental networks in turn delimited by
the corresponding routers (R1, R2, R3).
In this scenario, we have two type of network traffic:
normal and malicious. The former, comprise all HTTP com-
munications from all departmental end devices requesting
HTTP resources allocated at the several web servers placed
in Internet and DMZ. As it is can be seen on Figure 4, BR is
aware of all the incoming and ongoing traffic to the Internet.
On the other hand, Rx routers with x = 1, 2, 3, observe the
corresponding portion of the previous HTTP traffic which
is generated by the host in their bu-networks. Additionally,
departmental hosts request HTTP resources to the webserver
in the DMZ.
In respect to the malicious traffic, it is generated from
different locations in the predefined architecture simulating
very well known and state of the art attacks. They are: DoS
(high and low rate); port scanning, a relevant step on the
recognise phase in a penetration testing procedure; and data
exfiltration for privacy violation purposes.
We run our scenario during a period of 25 hours. During
the first 23.5 hours, only normal traffic is generated. During
the last hour and a half, the attacks previously described are
generated sequentially and not overlapped in time during 5
minutes each: high rate DoS, low rate DoS, scanning attack
and data exfiltration.
The different routers in the network (R1, R2, R3 and BR)
are equipped with Netflow inspectors that generates Netflow
v5 information. Such data is afterwards in real time consumed
by the corresponding MSNM-S which are deployed in the
mentioned network devices. These sensors are S1,2, S2,2, S2,3
and S1,1 which are represented by orange boxes in Figure 4.
All of them only consider a local data source: the generated
information of the corresponding netflow inspectors. However,
only S1,1 is also in charge of aggregates the monitoring
information in the form of statistics coming from the sensors
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Fig. 5. Q-st and D-st statistics evolution for the entire experiment (25 hours) (a) and for the attack period (last 1.5 hours) (b).
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Fig. 6. Q-st and D-st statistics evolution for the attack time interval in the
R1. It is clearly shown when the port scanning attack is taking place.
in the network lower level. Every minute a new observation
is gathered by each sensor meaning that two statistics are
generated every minute too.
B. Experimental results
As we stated in the previous sections a key characteristic
of the MSNM-S is its application in real and complex envi-
ronments to monitor a huge variety of devices and commu-
nications. Even more, the MSNM-S system is able to detect
abnormal behaviors in the whole system just considering a
couple of monitoring statistics. This is what we are going to
demonstrate in the following2.
Figure 5 shows the Q-st (blue inverted triangles) and D-st
(orange filled circles) statistics evolution with time got from
the BR sensor. Besides, upper control limits are also shown for
Q-st (UCLq) represented by a green dashed line and for D-st
(UCLd) in turn represented by a red continuos line. Subfigure
5(a) shows the statistics values for the total duration of the
experiment while Subfigure 5(b) is showing the last 1.5 hours
where the attacks were launched. In the first subfigure one we
can discern between three different intervals. In the first one
2In order to reproduce the obtained results, related data and scripts are
available at the official github repository.
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Fig. 7. Q-st and D-st statistics evolution for the attack time interval in the
R2. It is clearly shown when the data exfiltration attack is taking place.
14
:2
0
14
:2
5
14
:3
0
14
:3
5
14
:4
0
14
:4
5
14
:5
0
14
:5
5
15
:0
0
15
:0
5
15
:1
0
15
:1
5
15
:2
0
15
:2
5
15
:3
0
15
:3
5
15
:4
0
15
:4
5
15
:5
0
Observation time
10 1
103
107
1011
1015
1019
1023
Va
lu
e 
(lo
g)
routerR3 (attacks)
Qst
Dst
UClq
UCLd
Fig. 8. Q-st and D-st statistics evolution for the attack time interval in the
R3. It is clearly shown when the DoS attacks are taking place.
we are experiencing a high false positive rate which is caused
by the initial random calibration of the sensor. Each sensor
uses the EWMA (Exponentially Weighted Moving Average)
approach to dynamically calibrate the sensors every 60 mins
[23]. The second one covers almost all the experiment time
and we can see the effectiveness of the dynamic adaptation of
Fig. 9. MSNM-S dashboard snapshot of the monitoring view. The sensor’s (orange boxes) logical connections are shown in the upper section of the figure
while the monitoring graphs are in the bottom part.
the sensor to the environment because the computed values are
below the control limits almost all the time. Finally, the third
one, which shows a clear deviation in the normal behavior
of the statistics and the system in general. In this period,
the control limits are undoubtedly exceeded indicating that
something anomalous is happening.
Apart from the previous global results, it is worth to
pay special attention to the attack period of time. For that,
Subfigure 5(b) shows clear deviations of the statistics values
when the attacks are taking place. From DoS (high and low
rate) to data exfiltration, the MSNM-S sensor approach is
able to detect anomalous behaviors coming from different
parts of the whole systems just taking into account two
simple numerical values. Even more, we can also distinguish
where the anomaly is coming from by inspecting similar
monitoring graphics but, in these case, computed from each
of the involved router. It is can be seen in Figures 6, 7 and 8
for the sensors deployed at R1, R2 and R3 respectively. For
example, by means of the inspection of the R3 monitoring
graph we can conclude that the attack in originated somewhere
in the R3 network. Similarly, for R1 and R2 for port scanning
and data exfiltration attacks, respectively. How to unveil the
exact origin of the anomaly can be addressed by the diagnosis
procedure which is currently on development. Additionally,
one can see the dynamic adaptation on the sensor to the
changes in the environment. It is more evident in R3 (see
Figure 8).
Although the previous figures are included in the text for
the sake of clarification, it is worth to mention that the
MSNM-S application comes with a specific and interactive
dashboard. Thanks to it the security analyst of application
operator can, in real time, access to the previous information
and the logical connections of the sensors as well. An snapshot
of the monitoring main section of the tool is shown in Figure
9. On the one hand, the upper part is showing the logical
connections created among the sensor. The operator can see
in it the direction of the monitoring flow. In this specific
scenario, it is clearly shown how sensors in routers R1, R2
and R3 are configured to send their monitoring information to
the BR. On the other hand, the monitoring graphs will appear
in the bottom part by clicking on a specific sensor. Among
other actions, the operator can interact with these graphs to
pause/play the updating procedure for a better inspection. The
dashboard is really needed in whatever the monitoring system
that allows the operator to reduce the response/reaction time
when an attack is taking place.
V. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
This work introduces the MSNM-S, a practical and ready-
to-use tool to monitor and detect security events able to
manage complex systems and network environments. MSNM-
Sensor cope with new the technological challenges arising
from the all-connectivity scenario where millions of devices
are interconnected and sharing information.
MSNM-S has successfully been tested in hierarchical net-
work systems to monitor and detect well known network
attacks.
Implementing the anomaly diagnosis are one of our future
improvements. Additionally, the MSNM-S capabilities should
be tested in more complex environment e.g., IoT ecosystems
or those found in smart cities.
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